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Hastings Center Report, May-June 1993

n 15 Februaryof this year,

shortly after the number of
people Dr. Jack Kevorkian
had helped to commit suicide swelled to fifteen, the Michigan
legislature passed a law, effective that
very day, making assisted suicide a
felony punishable by up to four years
in prison. The law,which is automatically repealed six months after a
newly established commission on
death and dying recommends permanent legislation, prohibits anyone
with knowledge that another person
intends to commit suicide from "intentionally providing the physical
means" by which that other person
does so or from "intentionallyparticipat[ing] in a physical act" by which
she does so.1
A two-thirdsmajorityof each house
was needed to give the new Michigan
law immediate effect, but that requirement was easily met. The governor applauded the legislature and
signed the law the same day. But this
is not the end of the story. A week
later, the American Civil Liberties
Union of Michigan brought a lawsuit
on behalf of two cancer patients and
several health care professionals who
specialize in the care of the terminally ill, attacking the law's constitutionality. The essence of the challenge is that insofar as the law prohibits a health professional, family member, or friend from assisting a competent, terminally ill person who
wishes to hasten her death, the law
violates the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions and
the "Right to Privacy Guarantee" of
the state constitution.
If the Michigan Supreme Court
overturns the prohibition against assisted suicide on state constitutional
grounds, this particular lawsuit will
come to an end. If, however,as I think
likely, the state supreme court upholds the prohibition, the U.S. Supreme Court may decide to review
the matter. Since approximately
twenty-five states expressly prohibit
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The Supreme Court, reluctant to find constitutional rights
in areas marked by divisive social and legal debate, is not
likely to constitutionalize a right to assisted suicide. The
Court should cleave to the tradition of discouraging suicide
and criminalizing its assistance.

assisted suicide by statute and
another ten or twelve make some
types of assisted suicide a form of
murder or manslaughter,2 the Supreme Court is likely to address the
question in some case from some
state, whether Michigan or another,
in the near future.
In this article I shall only discuss
federal constitutional arguments for
invalidating laws against suicide. I
shall also discuss various reasons why
I believe these arguments will (and
should) fail.
Is There a "Right" to Commit
Suicide?
So far as I know, no state law makes
either suicide or attempted suicide a
crime. Why is this so? And what follows from this?
According to Dan Brock, who supports both physician-assistedsuicide
and voluntary active euthanasia, the
fact "that suicide or attempted suicide is no longer a criminal offense in
virtually all states indicates an acceptance of individual self-determination
in the taking of one's own life
analogous to that required for voluntary active euthanasia." I am not sure
what Professor Brock means by "acceptance"; it is an ambiguous term.
In context, however, he seems to be
viewing the fact that we no longer
punish suicide or attempted suicide

as approvalof these acts or at least as
recognitionthat self-determination or
autonomy extends this far-namely,
that taking one's life is a valid application or aspect of individual self-determination. If this is what he means, he
is quite mistaken.
As the most comprehensive and
most heavily documented law review
article ever written on the subject
makes clear, abolition of such "punishments" as ignominious burial for
suicide and then the decriminalization of both suicide and attempted
suicide did not come about because
suicide was deemed a "human right"
or even because it was no longer considered reprehensible. These changes
occurred, rather, because punishment was seen as unfair to innocent
relatives of the suicide and because
those who committed or attempted
to commit the act were thought to
be prompted by mental illness.4
Some of this thinking is reflected
in the comments to the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code.
The code does criminalize aiding or
soliciting another to commit suicide,
but not suicide itself or attempted suicide. Why not? "There is a certain
moral extravagance in imposing
criminal punishment on a person
who has sought his own self-destruction ... and who more properly requires medical or psychiatric attention."5
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Sympathy and pity for the individual who attempts suicide "emphatically did not mean approval of the
act." From colonial days through at
least the 1970s, "the predominant
attitude of society and the law has
been one of opposition to suicide."6
The Model Penal Code'sjudgment
that "there is no form of criminal
punishment that is acceptable for a
completed suicide and that criminal
punishment is singularly inefficacious to deter attempts to commit suicide" (p. 94) does not mean that
there is a "right"to commit the act. As
Leon Kasshas pointed out, the capacityto take one's life-"I have inclination, means, reasons, opportunity,
and you cannot stop me, and it is not
against the law"-does not establish
the rightto do so. Nor does it mean
that one has "ajustifiedclaim against
others that they act in a fitting manner."7As a practical matter, at least so
long as they do not resort to physical
violence, parents are "free"to treat
their children unkindly, even cruelly.
But few, if any, would say that a
mother or father has a "right"to be a
bad parent.
Society can do something about
those who aid anotherto commit suicide-and it has. Throughout our
history we have directed the force of
the criminal law against aiding or
assisting suicide. The commentary to
the Model Penal Code notes that the
fact that penal sanctions will not
deter the suicide itself

quickest way to refute the belief not a
few may hold that the reason for the
criminal prohibition against assisted
suicide falls into Holmes's category
is to point to the position taken by the
code. Its final "OfficialDraft"was the
product of many years of research,
deliberation, drafting, and revisingby
the most eminent criminal law
scholars of the 1950s and 60s, led by
Herbert Wechsler of Columbia University and Louis B. Schwartz of the
University of Pennsylvania. To quote
a leading scholar of the present day,
the code "has become the principal
text in criminal law teaching, the
point of departure for criminal law
scholarship, and the greatest single
influence on the many new state
codes that have followed in its wake."9
The Model Code's reporters considered the argument that the criminality of assisted suicide should turn
upon "the presence of a selfish motive" (a position supported by one of
its special consultants, England's
Glanville Williams), but concluded
that "the wiser course is to maintain
the prohibition and rely on mitigation in the sentence when the ground
for it appears."'0With the stimulus of
the Model Code, in the next decade
and a half, eight states passed new
laws specifically prohibiting assisted
suicide and eleven other jurisdictions
revised their existing statutes."

does not mean that the criminal
law is equally powerless to influence the behavior of those who
would aid or induce another to
take his own life. Moreover, in
principle it would seem that the
interests in the sanctityof life that
are represented by the criminal
homicide laws are threatened by
one who expresses a willingnessto
participate in taking the life of
another, even though the act may
be accomplished with the consent, or at the request, of the suicide victim (p. 100).
Another word about the Model
Penal Code. In the memorable dictum of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "It is
revolting to have no better reason for
a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV."8The

As a rallying cry, the "right to die"
is hard to beat. But it is much easier
to chant a slogan than to apply it to
specific situations. Most would consider the refusal of lifesaving medical procedures under certain circumstances (such as terminal illness
and severe pain) an apt illustration
of the "right to die." But the term
has also been used loosely and
broadly to embrace such claims as
the right to another's help in committing suicide and the right to
authorize another to engage in active
euthanasia.
Many proponents of the "right to
die" are quick to point out that the
"sanctityof life" is not an absolute or
unqualified value (and they are
right), but they are slow to realize that
the same is true of the "rightto die."

Does the "Right to Die" Include
the Right to Assisted Suicide?

There is no absolute or general
"right to die." The only right or liberty that the KarenAnn Quinlancase
and subsequent so-called "right to
die" rulings have established is the
right under certain circumstances to
be disconnected from artificial life
support systems or, as many have
called it, the right to die a natural
death. And the new Michigan ban
against assisted suicide recognizes
that right by explicitly excluding
"withholdingor withdrawingmedical
treatment"from its coverage. (It also
exempts "prescribing, dispensing or
administering" medication or treatment designed "torelieve pain or discomfort and not to cause death, even
if the medication or procedure may
hasten or increase the riskof death.")
In the 1970s, the Quinlan case
brought the "right to die" issue to
national prominence and set the
tone for the developments in law and
bioethics that followed. But the Quinlan court specifically distinguished
between committing or assisting in a
suicide and what it called "the ending
of artificiallife support systems"-the
only issue presented.12
As one of the leading commentators in this field, Rutgers Law
School's Norman Cantor, recently
observed: "The assertion that rejection of life-saving medical treatment
by competent patients constitutes
suicide has been uniformly rejected-usually based on a distinction between letting nature take its
course and initiating external deathcausing agents."'3
The distinction between euthanasia
(or, I believe, assisted suicide as well)
and "letting die" is elucidated in The
TroubledDream of Life, a soon-to-bepublished book by Daniel Callahan.
"Asa reality of nature," observes Dr.
Callahan, "killingand letting die are
causally different.... There must be
an underlying fatal pathology if allowing to die is even possible. Killing, by
contrast, provides its own fatal
pathology. Nothing but the action of
the doctor giving the lethal injection
is necessary to bring about death."'14
Since the reasons usually advanced
to distinguish persons terminating
life support from "ordinary"suicides
do not strikeJeb Rubenfeld as "altogether persuasive" (nor me either),
Professor Rubenfeld has suggested
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another answer to "this painful
riddle":
For right-to-die patients, being
forced to live is in fact to be forced
into a particular, all-consuming,
totally dependent, and indeed
rigidlystandardizedlife:the life of
one confined to a hospital bed,
attached to medical machinery,
and tended to by medical professionals. It is a life almost totally
occupied....
In contrast, the "ordinary"suicide
suffers no such total occupation
of his life or affirmativeuse of his
body.An avenue of escape is foreclosed to him [but the prohibition of suicide] does not, as a rule,
direct lives into a particular,narrowlyconfined course."
This is a thoughtful answer and an
interesting one. But still more interesting, I believe, is that this commentator, who has a strong commitment
to the right to privacyand who usually
interprets it expansively, evidently
feels a deep need (as I do) to draw a
boundary somehow between the
withholding or withdrawalof life-sustaining medical treatment and what
he calls "'ordinary'suicide."
The one "right to die" case that
rivals Quinlan for prominence is the
1990 Nancy BethCruzandecision, the
only case on death, dying, and the
"rightof privacy"ever decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court. As did Quinlan,
the Cruzancase involved the right to
end artificial life support, and it too
provides no comfort to proponents
of a constitutional right to assisted
suicide.
The Cruzan Court sustained a
state's power to keep alive, over her
family's objections, an incompetent
patient who had not left clear instructions for ending life-sustaining
treatment. In the course of rejecting the efforts of Ms. Cruzan's
parents to terminate her artificial
feeding, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who spoke for five members of the
Court, pointed out that a state has
an undeniable interest in the protection and preservation of human
life-even the life of a person in a
persistent vegetative state. The chief
justice supported this assertion by
noting that "the majority of states in
this country have laws imposing

criminal penalties on one who assists
another to commit suicide."'16
If a majorityof the Supreme Court
meant to suggest that laws against
assisted suicide are constitutionally
suspect, it chose a strange way of
doing so.
The chief justice "assumedfor purposes of this case" that a competent
person does have "a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesavinghydration and nutrition." But he declined to characterize it as a "fundamental right," a designation that
requires a state to offer a compelling
justification for a right's restriction (a
test the state can rarely satisfy). He
called the right instead a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest: "Although many state courts have held
that a right to refuse treatment is
encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have
never so held. We believe this issue is
more properly analyzed in terms of a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest."
"By avoiding 'fundamental right'
language," comments John Robertson, "the Court may implicitly allow
states to restrict the 'liberty interest'
upon a lesser showing of need than it
would require if that interest were
characterized as a fundamental
right." Perhaps "anyreasonable state
interest" would justify state interference with that liberty "orat least one
which did not impose an 'undue
burden.'"'17
Of course, the Court did not suggest that one has even so much as "a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest" in assisted suicide, and I cannot believe that it will do so in the
foreseeable future. If I am right, a
Court assessing the constitutionality
of a ban against assisted suicide
would give great deference to the
state legislature; if it furthered some
coherent conception of the public
good, that would probably suffice.
The Cruzan case is hardly the
Court'slast word on death, dying, termination of life support, assisted suicide, and euthanasia. The principles
lurking in this area will be brought
into sharper focus only by new prodding of the facts of new cases and by
taking a fresh look, each time, at the
overall problem. If Cruzan demonstrates anything, however, I think it

signals the reluctance of the High
Court to "constitutionalize"an area
marked by divisive social and legal
debate and its inclination to defer
instead to the states' judgments in
this difficult field.'8 A Court that refused to "constitutionalize"a "rightto
die" broad enough to uphold the
claims of the Cruzan family is hardly
likely to "constitutionalize"a right to
assisted suicide.
Justice Scalia's Opinion
We should not forget that there was
onejustice in the Cruzancase who did
equate the termination of life support with "ordinary" suicide-Antonin Scalia. Although his lone concurring opinion was more or less ignored by the other justices, it should
not go unnoticed.
Justice Scalia maintained that for
constitutional purposes "there is
nothing distinctive about accepting
death through the refusal of 'medical
treatment,' as opposed to accepting it
through the refusal of [natural] food,
or through the failure to shut off the
engine and get out of the car after
parking in one's garage after work."
As he viewed the case, the request of
Nancy Cruzan's parents to terminate
their daughter's artificialfeeding and
hydration was, in effect, the assertion
of a "rightto suicide."
But Justice Scalia is well aware that
"on the question you ask depends the
answer you get." A principal reason,
surely, why he framed the question
the way he did was his confidence
that there was no way a majority of
the Court would recognize a constitutional right to commit suicide. And
nothing any of the other eight justices said suggests that Scalia's confidence was unfounded.
In fact, the other justices did not
say anything about a "right to suicide." None of them disputed Scalia's
point "that American law has always
accorded the State the power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide."
Nor did any of them disagree that
"there is no significant support for
the claim that a right to suicide is so
rooted in our tradition that it may be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty."'As
Louis Seidman remarks, the Cruzan
dissenters "carefullyavoid any claim
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that state suicide statutes are unconstitutional-a reticence that Justice
Scalia powerfully exploits in his concurring opinion."9 This is a reticence, I might add, that does not
bode well for proponents of a constitutional right to assisted suicide.
Although none of Justice Scalia's
colleagues responded in so many
words to his argument that the termination of lifesaving medical treatment constitutes suicide, they responded nevertheless. They all
framed the question in terms of a
right to refuse or to be free from "unwanted medical treatment" or, more
specifically,"unwantedartificialnutrition and hydration."
As a matterof logic,I think there is a
good deal to be said for analogizing a
patient's termination of life-sustaining medical treatment to "ordinary"
suicide. But law is not entirely a syllogism.
It may be helpful to view the Cruzan
case as involving two competing traditions.20 One is the common-law right
to refuse medical treatment, even
lifesaving surgery--in the language
of the Court, "the logical corollary of
the doctrine of informed consent," a
doctrine "firmlyentrenched in American tort law,"is the right not to consent, that is, to reject treatment. The
other tradition, which has continued
to exist alongside the first one, is the
antisuicide tradition, as evidenced by
society's discouragement of suicide
and attempted suicide and by the
many criminal laws against assisted
suicide.
In Cruzan a majority, perhaps as
many as eight justices, evidently decided that the termination of artificial nutrition and hydrationwas more
consistent with the rationale of the
cases upholding the right to refuse
treatment; so far as we can tell, only
Justice Scalia believed it implicated
the concerns underlying the antisuicide tradition.
Assisted Suicide vs. Active
Voluntary Euthanasia
The line between doctor-assisted
suicide and physician-administered
voluntary euthanasia is a fine one
that is often blurred. Voluntary euthanasia "has been variously described as 'assisted suicide' or 'within

the knife's edge between suicide and
murder,'"and suicide has sometimes
been called "self-administeredeuthanasia.'21
Doctor-assisted suicide is not quite
active voluntary euthanasia for, unlike euthanasia, the final act, the one
that brings on death, is performed by

"it puts the physician in a very powerful position," whereas in the case of
doctor-assisted suicide "the balance
of power between doctor and patient
is more nearly equal."23
I find this reasoning more conclusory than explanatory. Dr. Quill
would require many safeguards for

euthanasia
wouldreceiveveryseriousconsidVoluntary
erationonceassistedsuicidewerelegalizedor as soon
a constitutional
asthe SupremeCourtestablished
right
suicide.
to commit"rational"

the patient herself, not her doctor.
But suppose that a person is unable to
swallow the barbiturates that will
bring about death or lacks the physical capacity to trigger a suicide machine? If the right to control the time
and manner of one's death-the
right to shape one's death in the most
humane and dignified manner one
chooses-is well founded, how can it
be denied to someone simplybecause
she is unable to perform the final act
by herself? Although there is a "mechanical"distinction between assisted
suicide and euthanasia, is it not a distinction without a difference?
Yes, answered the late Joseph
Fletcher, who advocated active euthanasia for some fifty years. As he
viewed the matter, "Itis impossible to
separate [active voluntary euthanasia] from suicide; it is indeed, a form
of suicide"and the case for active voluntary euthanasia "depends upon
the case for the righteousness of suicide." James Rachels, author of a
famous assault on the distinction between "killing"and "letting die," similarly maintains that "the permissibility of euthanasia follows from the
permissibilityof suicide-a result that
probably will not surprise any
thoughtful person."22
That may be, but it is a result some
thoughtful persons have strongly resisted. Thus, in his new book, Dr.
Timothy Quill comes out in favor of
physician-assistedsuicide but balks at
active voluntary euthanasia. He does
not support euthanasia because of
the "potentialfor abuse"and because

doctor-assisted suicide (the patient
must freely, clearly, and repeatedly
ask to die; her judgment must not be
distorted; the physician must make
sure that the patient's suffering and
request are not the product of inadequate comfort care). If, as he believes,
these safeguards would greatly reduce the risk of abuse and render the
balance of power between doctor and
patient relatively equal, why would
they not achieve the same results for
voluntary euthanasia? Conversely, if,
even when all the safeguards Quill
proposes are in place, it would still be
imprudent to legalize active voluntary euthanasia, why is it safe to sanction assisted suicide?
Quill recognizes that "access to
medical care in the United States is
too inequitable and many doctorpatient relationships too impersonal
to tolerate the risks of condoning active voluntary euthanasia" (p. 160).
But why can't the very same thing be
said about tolerating the risksof condoning assisted suicide?
I find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that Dr. Quill's position is
colored by the fact, as he notes, that
"unlike assisted suicide, where the
legal implications have yet to be fully
clarified, euthanasia is illegal in all
states in the United States and likely
to be vigorouslyprosecuted" (p. 142).
Dr. Quill and I disagree about a number of things. But I venture to say we
are in agreement on one: the uniform ban against active euthanasia is
not going to be struck down on the
ground that it violates the "right to

35
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Fri, 9 Jan 2015 15:38:34 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Hastings Center Report, May-June 1993

die." Therefore, a proponent of the
right to assisted suicide is understandably likely to put as much distance as possible between that concept and euthanasia.
Although he would not legalize voluntary euthanasia, at least not at this
time, Dr. Quill does consider it "an
area worthy of our serious consideration, since it would allow patients
who have exhausted all other reasonable options to choose death
rather than continue suffering" (p.
143). I make bold to say that voluntary euthanasia would receive veryserious consideration once assisted suicide were legalized or as soon as the
Supreme Court established a constitutional right to commit "rational"
suicide.
Although I am opposed to both assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia, I find the position of Professor
Brock (who supports both practices)
more coherent and more principled
than Dr. Quill's:
In both [assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia], the choice
restsfullywith the patient. In both
[cases] the patient acts last in the
sense of the right to change his or
her mind until the point at which
the lethal process becomes irreversible....
If there is no significant, intrinsic
moral difference between the
two, it is difficult to see why public
or legal policy should permit one
but not the other; worries about
abuse or about giving anyone dominion over the lives of others
apply equallywell to either.24
The fine distinction between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia was blurred by the hard-fought
campaigns in Washington (1991)
and California (1992) to legalize "aidin-dying," a label covering both assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. I watched both campaigns very
closely and came away with the distinct impression that few, if any, understood the distinction between the
two practices, paid any attention to it,
or cared one whit about it.
The inabilityof the media, the public, and even members of the medical
profession to grasp this fine distinction is powerfully illustrated by a
two-hour presentation, "Choosing

Death," a program shown on most
PBS stations about the time this article was going to press.
Although the program was billed as
a "debate about euthanasia," it soon
became clear that it was a debate
about assisted suicide as well. Very
early in the program the moderator,
Roger Mudd, announced: "The issue
is doctor-assisted suicide and euthanasia." At another point he asked
Professor Margaret Battin whether
there was any way "other than euthanasia or physician-assistedsuicide ...
to end suffering."Still later, he asked
a physician affiliated with Harlem
Hospital "whether you think euthanasia-physician-assisted suicideposes any dangers to America's
minorities."25 And although Dr. Jack
Kevorkian has been careful never to
practice active voluntary euthanasia
(all the people he helped die by suicide performed "the last act" themselves), he appeared in the opening
segment.
It is difficult to fault the moderator
for treating assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia interchangeably.
After all, none of the physicians or
bioethicists who appeared on the
program saw the need or, at any rate,
took the trouble to draw any distinction between the two concepts. At
one point Dr. Howard Brody maintained that "we can find other alternatives that don't require physicianassisted suicide or euthanasia." And
at another point Professor Dan
Brock pointed out that "we ought to
be doing our best to improve all
dying patients' care, whatever one's
view about assisted suicide, or euthanasia, is." (As mentioned earlier,Professor Brock doesn't see any real distinction between the two concepts. Is
this also true of all the others who
appeared on the program?)
Can the Right to Assisted Suicide
be Confined to the Terminally Ill?
No doubt the ACLU, in challenging the constitutionality of the Michigan prohibition against assisted suicide, will frame the issue narrowly;it
will emphasize that it is only asserting
the rights of the terminallyill who
may desire death by suicide. But is
there any principled way so to limit
the right?

Of course, it is good advocacy to
frame the issue in terms of the rights
of the "dying"or "terminallyill," but
what reason (other than those of tactics) can be advanced for this position? If the merciful termination of
suffering (or termination of an unendurable existence) is the basis for this
right, why limit it to those who are
terminally ill? As Professor Robert
Wennberg has asked:
Why... should the non-terminal
nature of one's suffering exclude
one from qualifying or make it
more difficultfor one to qualifyas
a fitting subjectfor suicide? To be
sure, the person with a non-terminal illness has longer to live, and
should that person choose to
commit suicide, he or she would
be eliminating a greater span of
future existence.... But [such a]
person is also eliminating a proportionately greater quantum of
pain and suffering, and if the
smaller quantum justifies the
elimination of the shorter span of
life, then the greater quantum
might justify the elimination of
the longer span.26
Alan Sullivan, who has presented
one of the best arguments for a constitutional right to suicide, makes
plain that he would not limit such a
right to the terminally ill. "Surely,"he
observes, "under a variety of circumstances life may be unendurable to a
reasonable person, even though he
does not face the prospect of immediate and painful death."27
It is interesting to note that, although he carefully circumscribes
the right to assisted suicide in many
respects, Dr. Quill would not limit it
to the terminally ill. "The patient
must have a condition," Quill tells us,
"that is incurable, and associated
with severe, unrelenting suffering."
Though he anticipates that most
people who desire physician-assisted
suicide "willbe imminently terminal,"
Quill does "not want to arbitrarily
exclude persons with incurable, but
not imminently terminal, progressive
illnesses such as ALS or multiple
sclerosis."'"But is it any less arbitrary
to exclude the quadriplegic?The victim ofa paralyticstroke?The mangled
survivorof a road accident? A person
afflicted with severe arthritis?
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Why stop there? If a competent
person comes to the unhappy conclusion that his existence is unbearable
and freely, clearly,and repeatedly requests assisted suicide, why should
he be rebuffed because he does not
"qualify"under somebody else's standards? Isn't this an arbitrary limitation of self-determination and personal autonomy? "How,"asks Daniel
Callahan, "can self-determination
have any limits?Why are not the person's desires or motives, whatever
they be, sufficient?"29
As I understand the position of
those advocating a constitutional
right to suicide and to assisted suicide, a person who "qualifies"should
have the same right to enlist the aid
of others to die by suicide as one
now has to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining medical treatment.3s
If so, it is fairly clear that once established, the right to assisted suicide
will not be restricted to the terminally ill. For as demonstrated by
such decisions as ElizabethBouvia, a
case involving a young woman with
severe cerebral palsywho was not terminally ill, and Larry McAfee,a case
involving a quadriplegic who apparently had a long life expectancy,
the right to terminate life support
has not been so limited. Indeed, the
view that life support cannot be
stopped unless a patient is terminally
ill-a notion that may have originated in pre-Quinlan cases involving
the refusal of blood transfusions by
Jehovah's Witnesses-is one of the
"myths" that Professor Alan Meisel
has recently dispelled.31
Upholding the Prohibition
I share the view that before a state
can punish its citizens for their actions, "it must do more than assert
that the choice they have made is an
'abominable crime not fit to be
named among Christians."'I agree,
too, that "the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice." But I believe that any state that
prohibits assisted suicide can advance
justifications for its legislation that go
well beyond the law's conformity to
religious doctrine or "morality."And

I think these justifications are sufficiently strong to withstand constitutional attack.
I am well aware that the reasons I
shall set forth for upholding the new
Michigan law and similar laws were
not the originalreasonsfor condemning suicide and assisted suicide. But

ment or a failure to recognize or adequately to treat depressive illness influenced by prejudice against and
stereotypes about elderly people?
How likely is it that the social
sanctioning of "rational"suicide and
assisted suicide will lead to an increase in "irrational"suicide and as-

Any state that prohibits assisted suicide can advance
justifications for its legislation that go well beyond the
law's conformity to religious doctrine or "morality."

the new "good reasons" people give
for old rules and policies "do influence the development of these
policies" and "the 'good reasons'
professed by our fathers yesterdayare
among the real reasons of the life of
today."Assigning better reasons for
the ban against assisted suicide than
the old religious taboo against touching the gates of life and death may be
dismissed by some as a process of rationalization, "but the seeking for
good reasons ... plays a leading role
in the life of civilization."33
After all, that the criminal law arose
to fill the need to regulate self-help
and to obviate private vengeance
does not render deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation any
less of a "realreason"for drafting new
criminal codes or revising old ones.
Philosophers have spent much
time and effort addressing such questions as, When, if ever, is it "rational"
for a person to want to commit suicide? Is there a moral right to commit
"rational"suicide? But I think a legislator considering the desirabilityof a
law prohibiting assisted suicide and a
judge determining the constitutionality of such a law could ask more
relevant questions, such as:
So far as we can tell, how common
or rare is "rational" suicide? How
often does suicide occur in the absence of a psychiatric disorder? How
often do primary care physicians fail
to recognize treatable depression in
their patients, especially elderly
patients? How often is the failure of a
primary care physician to take an aggressive approach to pain manage-

sisted suicide? In a suicide-permissive
society, how often will the "right"to
commit suicide and the "right"to enlist the assistance of others in this enterprise be interpreted, especially by
the most vulnerable, as the "duty"to
do so? In a suicide-permissivesociety,
how often will a burdensome, elderly
relative not otherwise desirous of
death be "helped along" or pressured
or "manipulated"into suicide?
At one point in his argument for a
constitutional right to suicide (and
for the corollary right to enjoin
government agents from taking steps
to prevent suicide), Alan Sullivan disposes of a possible objection to his
position-"that one suicide might encourage other suicides and ought, for
that reason, to be proscribed"--on
the ground that "itrests upon psychological assumptions about the suicidal character that are beyond the
scope of this essay."
When writing about various subjects I too have put some issues "beyond the scope of this essay."After all,
there is only so much time and space
to explore a difficult problem (or a
cluster of problems). So Mr.Sullivan's
decision is understandable, especially
when one keeps in mind that suicide
is a complicated subject that cuts
across many disciplines. But a court
assessing the constitutionality of a
criminal prohibition against assisted
suicide does not have the same luxury. It cannot put psychological assumptions and insights and "psychological autopsy" studies of persons
who die by suicide "beyond the
scope" of their inquiries.
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Such a court must do more, much
more, than simply reason by analogy
from the relevant precedents on the
books. And such a court must keep in
mind that it is doing something quite
different from simply judging a debate among philosophers. As Professor Philip Devine has observed:
If philosophers have something
to say to the law, so also has the
law something to say to philosophers. Attention to the working,
or the possible working, of any
institution or principle may well
give us insight into weaknesses
which remain concealed so long
as it is posed in sufficiently abstractterms.35
The Dangers of Establishing a
"Right" to Assisted Suicide
Suicide is a problem of considerable magnitude. Although it once
ranked twenty-second on the list of
causes of death in the United States,
it now ranks (depending on the particular year) eighth or ninth. Every
year there are between 25,000 and
30,000 reported cases of suicide (and
the number of cases is probably
grossly underreported both because
of the social stigma that attaches and
because of the possible loss of life
insurance benefits). Moreover, it is
estimated that every year in this
country several hundred thousand
people attempt suicide and that
about 10 percent of that group go on
to kill themselves within a ten-year
period. Although suicide occurs at
an alarming rate among young
suicide in this
people-adolescent
country increased 300 percent in the
twenty years between 1955 and 1975,
while suicides in the fifteen-to-twentyfour age group now constitute about
one-fifth of all reported suicides-the
highest suicide rates and the greatest
number of suicides are found among
people over the age of fifty. Indeed,
for American white males, from
childhood on, the risk of suicide rises
linearly with age until the eighth decade of life. Suicides by people over
the age of sixty account for about 25
percent of all suicides.36
No doubt the higher rate of suicide
among the elderly has led advocates
of the right to "rational"suicide and
to assisted suicide to focus on this age

group, especially on elderly people
who are terminally ill. But the problem of suicide is a good deal more
complicated. Consider the views of
Herbert Hendin, a professor of psychiatry and a leading suicidologist,
who is opposed to the legalization of
doctor-assisted suicide. He concedes
that it is sometimes "rational"for a
person with a painful terminal illness
to wish to end his life. Indeed, "thatis
precisely why supporters of the 'right
to suicide' or 'death control' position
are constantly presenting the case of
a patient suffering from incurable,
painful cancer as the case on which
they based their argument." But Dr.
Hendin is quick to add:
In reality... such understandable
cases form only a small percentage of all suicides, or potential
suicides. The majorityof suicides
confront us with the problem of
understanding people whose situation does not seem, from an
outsider's viewpoint, hopeless or
often even critical. The knowledge that there are more suicides
by people who wrongly believe
themselves to be suffering from
cancer than there are suicides by
those who actually have cancer
puts the7problem in some perspective.s
According to suicidologist David
Clark, "the major studies all agree in
showing that the fraction of suicide
victims struggling with terminal illness at the time of their death is in the
range of 2% to 4%." Two-thirds of
those who died by suicide when they
were in their late sixties, seventies,
and eighties "were in relatively good
physical health."38
To ask another relevant question,
how often does suicide occur in the
absence of a major psychiatric illness? It would not be surprisingif the
answer to this question were affected
by what one thought about the
"right" to commit suicide. Some
believe that virtually every person
who wishes to die by suicide is "mentally ill." Others maintain that such a
person is simply called mentally ill so
that his behavior may be controlled.
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore
the studies that do seem to bear on
this question. And when one dips
into the relevant literature one dis-

covers considerable authority for the
view that a suicide rarelyoccurs in the
absence of a major psychiatric disorder.
Two of Timothy Quill's colleagues
on the University of Rochester medical faculty, Yeates Conwell and Eric
Caine, geriatric psychiatrists who
"work with suicidal people every
day," warn that "notably lacking"
from the debate about rational suicide and physician-assistedsuicide is
"attention to the effects of psychiatric illness on rational decision
making." They point to suicide study
findings that "90 to 100 percent of
the victims die while they have a diagnosable psychiatric illness, an observation that is equally true in suicides
among the elderly."9 A number of
other commentators use similarly
high figures.
The most commonly cited disorders associated with suicide are depressive affective disorders, also
called "depressive illness" or "major
depression," a verifiable and diagnosable condition that is usually responsive to prompt treatment. One
aspect of major depression, that of
hopelessness (which is transient and
likely to respond to treatment), appears to be the most probable and
frequent source of the impairment
that often leads to suicide.
More significant for our purposes, I
think, than the prevalence of depressive illness among people who die by
suicide is the inability of depressed
persons to recognize the severity of
their own symptoms and the failure
of primaryphysicians to detect major
depression in their patients, especially elderly patients. As Conwell and
Caine emphasize:
[M]any doctors on the front lines,
who would be responsible for implementing any policy that allowed assisted suicide, are ill
equipped to assess the presence
and effect of depressive illness in
older patients. In the absence of
that sophisticatedunderstanding,
the determination of a suicidal
patient's "rationality"can be no
more than speculation, subject to
the influence of personal biases
about aging, old age, and the
psychological effects of chronic
disease.4?
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"Ageism"-the prejudices and
stereotypes applied to the elderly
solely on the basis of their age-may
manifest itself in a failure to recognize treatable depression, a refusal to
take an aggressive approach to pain
management, the view that an elderly
person's desire to commit suicide is
more "rational" than a younger
patient's would be. As sociologist
Menno Boldt has observed, "Suicidal
persons are succumbing to what they
experience as an overpowering and
unrelenting coercion in their environment to cease living. This sense
of coercion takes many familiar
forms: fear, isolation, abuse, uselessness, and so on."41
Will these pressures intensify in a
society that sanctions assisted suicide
(and thereby suicide as well)? In a
suicide-permissive society, will family
members so inclined be more likely
to alter or manipulate a sick, elderly
person's circumstances (for example,
by providing shoddy or even hostile
care) so that suicide becomes a reasonable, even an attractivechoice?
In a climate in which suicide is the
"rational"thing to do, or at least a
"reasonable" option, will it become
the unreasonable
not to do?
thing a
The noble thing to do?4
In suicidepermissive society plagued by shortages of various kinds and a growing
population of "nonproductive"
people,
how likely is it that an old or ill
person will be encouraged to spare
both herself and her family the
agony of a slow decline, even though
she would not have considered suicide on her own?
The best discussion of both circumstantial manipulation and ideological manipulation appears in a
famous essay by the philosopher
Margaret Battin who, ironically, is a
proponent of rational suicide. In an
all-too-rare display of openminded,
balanced scholarship, Professor Battin presents a strong case against her
own ultimate position. She conscientiously spells out how acceptance of
her views would open the way for
both individualand societalmanipulation of vulnerable people into choosing death by suicide when they would
not otherwise have done so. She concludes, nevertheless, that "on moral
grounds we must accept, not reject,
the notion of rational suicide.'43

A state legislature is free to agree
with Professor Battin, but must it? Is it
constitutionally required to do so? I
hardly think so. I believe a legislature
is free to give Battin's insights about
the dangers of "manipulatedsuicide"
more weight than she herself seems

believe, to assisted suicide. As Martin
Marty and Ron Hamel have pointed
out, "Weare not merely a collection
of isolated, self-determining individuals." It is unrealistic to think that we
can sanction assisted suicide by individuals without having an impact

In a climate in which suicide is the "rational"
thing to do,
or at least a "reasonable"option, will it become the
unreasonablething not to do?

willing to do; that is one of the risks,if
one may call it that, one takes when
one produces the kind of high-quality
scholarship she does.
Professor Battin may be saying
something else: she may be conceding that the dangers of "manipulated
suicide" arequite substantial,but they
are trumpedby one's "fundamental
right" to die by suicide. At one point
she maintains that we cannot deny
"individuals in intolerable and irremediable circumstances their fundamentalrightto die." Whether there
is a "fundamental right" is the question, not the answer. I don't know
how those of us who are not religious
can get an authoritative ruling on
whether morallythere is a "fundamental right" to choose death by suicide.
But I think I do know that legallythere
is no such right. As we have seen, a
decade after Professor Battin wrote
her provocative essay, the Cruzan
Court declined to accord the much
less controversial liberty to terminate
life-sustaining treatment "fundamental right"status.
Although she is painfully aware of
"the moral quicksand"into which the
notion of rational suicide "threatens
to lead us,"Professor Battinvoices the
hope that if we accept that concept
"perhapsthen we may discover a path
around" the quicksand. Perhaps. Perhaps not. In any event, I submit, the
Constitution does not prevent a
legislature from reaching the conclusion that there is no safe path around.
Some Final Thoughts
What has been said of voluntary
active euthanasia applies as well, I

upon "the various communities of
which they are a part, and even
society as a whole."44
I am willing to concede that the
line between withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment (what many have called passive
euthanasia) and "ordinary" suicide
and assisted suicide is not a neat, logical line. But what line is? Surely not
the line between assisted suicide and
voluntary active euthanasia. Nor the
line between the right of a terminally
ill person to enlist the assistance of
others in committing suicide and the
right of a quadriplegic to seek similar
assistance, or the right of a person
who finds her inability even to shift
position in her wheelchair intolerable, or the right of a person with a
progressive illness.
I cannot believe that any court will
recognize a constitutional right to suicide on request. But unless we carry
the principle of self-determination or
personal autonomy to its logical extreme-assisted suicide by any competent person who clearly and repeatedly requests it for anyreason she
deems appropriate-we have to find
a "stopping point" somewhere along
the way.Any such stopping point will
be somewhat illogical, somewhat arbitrary.So why not maintain the line
we have now?
Albert Alschuler, my counterpart at
the University of Chicago Law
School, recently declared: "[T]he
strongest argument for the actioninaction line is that, despite its indeterminacy and imprecision, we need
it. We have no other line, and without
it we sense no limits." Professor
Alschuler may have overstated the
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case, but not, I think, by very much.
Why step across "the historic divide"
only to draw another somewhat illogical, somewhat arbitrary line somewhere else? "[I]t is easier to move
further down the slope than to climb
back up.'"5
In this article I have been focusing
on the constitutional dimensions of
the right to shape one's death. Thus,
I do not have to argue that a state
ought not cross the historic divide
(although I would); I need only
argue that it is not constitutionally
compelled to do so. Consider the
modern history of our attitudes and
beliefs concerning death and dying:
Recent court decisions have rejected many of the distinctions
commentators have proposed in
earlier discussions about the right
to die: not only the distinction
between ordinary and extraorditreatment, but also the
nary...
distinction
between
actively
death
hastening
by terminating
treatment and passively allowing
a person to die of a disease, between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, and
between the termination of artificial feedings and the termination
of other forms of life-sustaining
treatment.46
If, as has well been said, "the history of our activities and beliefs concerning the ethics of death and dying
is a history of lost distinctions of
former significance,"47 what reason is
there to think that that history will
come to an end when we sanction
assisted suicide for the terminally ill?
What reason is there to doubt that in
the not-too-distant future the distinction between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia or the distinction
between the terminally ill and other
seriously ill people would become
still other "lost distinctions of former
significance"?
I can hear the cries of protest:
"slippery slope" arguments are a common debating tactic. Yes they areabout as common as the technique of
overcoming opposition to a desired
goal by proceeding step by step.

I am grateful to my colleagues Larry
Kramer and Richard Pildes, and Univer-

sity of Michigan law student Marc Spindelman for helpful comments.
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